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Note
Taking Riggs Seriously: The ATCA Case Against a
Corporate Abettor of Pinochet Atrocities
Shaw W Scott*
In June 2004, a U.S. congressional investigation revealed
that Riggs Bank (Riggs) had opened, maintained, and concealed
at least six bank accounts for the former Chilean dictator, Au-
gusto Pinochet.1 This news came as a surprise to many who be-
lieved that Pinochet, although a brutal dictator, was not a cor-
rupt one.2 Pinochet, a general in the Chilean army, came to
power during a bloody military coup in Chile on September 11,
1973.3 During his seventeen-year dictatorship, the military
government committed numerous atrocities ranging from exe-
cutions and torture to terrorist acts and disappearances. 4 While
Pinochet himself refuses to accept responsibility for these
atrocities, the Chilean army recently admitted to its involve-
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author would like to thank
Professor Susan D. Franck and her editors Catherine A. Biestek and Elizabeth
T. Crouse for their helpful comments and encouragement and Martin J. Kifer
for his endless support.
1. MINORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
108TH CONG., MONEY LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION:
ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PATRIOT ACT (Comm. Print 2004)
[hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
2. See Shirley Christian, Pinochet Is in No Hurry To Relax an Iron Grip,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1986, at A6; Pinochet's Tarnished Coin, ECONOMIST, Aug.
7, 2004, at 32; Eugene Robinson, The South American Way of Graft; Everyone's
Used to the System, but There Won't Be Economic Recovery Without Some Real
Reform, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1990, at C1.
3. ROGER BURBACH, THE PINOCHET AFFAIR: STATE TERRORISM AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE 1 (2003).
4. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NAT'L COMM'N ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION 35-39 (Philip E. Berryman trans., 1993). Pinochet remained
head of the Chilean army until March 1998, at which time he was named
senator for life. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and Interna-
tional Human Rights Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2129, 2133 (1999).
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ment in an institutionalized campaign of human rights viola-
tions during the Pinochet government.5
Despite international knowledge and condemnation of
widespread human rights abuses under Pinochet,6 Riggs has
had a relationship with Pinochet and the Chilean military dat-
ing at least as far back as the mid-1970s. 7 Records reveal that
Riggs consistently turned a blind eye to Pinochet's atrocities by
both financing his brutal military dictatorships and concealing
and laundering millions of dollars in suspicious funds held in
bank accounts for Pinochet.9
Although a Chilean court recently indicted Pinochet on
kidnapping and murder charges, he has thus far escaped prose-
cution for leading a violent campaign of human rights abuses. 10
5. Larry Rohter, Chile's Army Accepts Blame for Rights Abuses in the Pi-
nochet Era, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A5.
6. See, e.g., David Binder, U.S.-Chilean Ties Called Strained, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1975, at 5 (noting that the United Nations Social, Cultural,
and Humanitarian Committee voted on a resolution calling for human rights
protections in Chile); Paul Hoffman, Torture in Chile Is Charged by a U.N. In-
quiry Team, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1975, at 8 (stating that a United Nations re-
port on Chile found charges of torture, disappearance, and elimination); Jona-
than Kandell, Chile's Junta After a Year: Unrelenting Dictatorship, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1974, at 1 (stating that more than 2500 people died during
the coup and afterwards); Thomas W. Netter, U.N. Panel Urges Chile To Halt
Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1986, at 5 (reporting that a United Na-
tions resolution urged a halt to torture and restoration of democracy in Chile);
Juan de Onis, Chile Study Says Torture Goes On, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1976, at
1 (noting that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, which is part of
the Organization of American States, reported charges of arbitrary imprison-
ment, torture, persecution, and killings in Chile); U.N. Panel Asserts Chile
Continues To Abuse Rights but on a Reduced Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1977,
at 42 (stating that there was "evidence that violations of human rights were
becoming institutionalized in Chile").
7. PETER KORNBLUH, THE PINOCHET FILE: A DECLASSIFIED DOSSIER ON
ATROCITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 224 (2003) (stating that the secret police and
its director under Pinochet maintained accounts at Riggs in 1975).
8. See Kenneth Bredemeier, Riggs Bank Stands Pat on Loans to South
Africa, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1979, at B3; Christopher Dickey, Human Rights
Groups Start Boycott of Riggs Bank Over Loan Policies, WASH. POST, June 16,
1979, at C2; Quarterly Profit Up Sharply at Gannett, Media General, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 1988, at Cl.
9. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3.
10. See Larry Rohter, Chilean Judge Says Pinochet Is Fit for Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al. On December 13, 2004, a Chilean judge ruled that
Pinochet was competent to stand trial for his alleged involvement in an intel-
ligence operation to kidnap and murder political opponents. Id. Known as Op-
eration Condor, this plan was a joint action set up by military dictatorships in
Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in the mid-1970s.
Id. The Chilean Supreme Court upheld Pinochet's indictment and house arrest
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However, recent application of U.S. law may open the door to
suits against Riggs for its association with Pinochet and his
dictatorship. The Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),11 which allows
foreigners to sue defendants in U.S. courts for alleged torts in
violation of international law, has become an important weapon
in the effort to hold human rights violators and their accom-
plices accountable. 12 Victims of human rights abuse have filed
an increasing number of these lawsuits against multinational
corporations alleging both direct and indirect involvement in
state-sponsored atrocities.' 3
Those who view the ATCA as a powerful tool against hu-
man rights abuse argue that when corporate defendants will-
fully assist clients who have violated human rights, their com-
plicity in the perpetrators' acts should create a legal liability
under international law. 14 A multinational corporation's eco-
nomic wealth and power often allow it to exceed state bounda-
ries and operate outside of state control, thus providing no ef-
fective recourse to those injured by its actions. 15 This may be
especially true of financial institutions that provide financing
to support oppressive governments and terrorist organizations.
There is arguably a point at which a bank, such as Riggs,
ceases being a "passive repository" for illegally obtained funds
of human rights violators and becomes an "active participant"
on January 4, 2005. Larry Rohter, Chile: Court Upholds Pinochet Indictment,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A6.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
12. See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 325, 387 (1998); see also
Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 461 (1989) (noting that Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980), which held that the ATCA provides
jurisdiction and recognizes a cause of action under U.S. law, "open[ed] up a
new field of human rights litigation").
13. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 48, 50-51 (2d Cir.
2003); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2d Cir. 2002); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d
440, 443 (2d Cir. 2000); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin,
978 F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
14. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 335; see also Michael J. O'Donnell,
A Turn for the Worse: Foreign Relations, Corporate Human Rights Abuse, and
the Courts, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 264 (2004). ("[W]here corporate de-
fendants are guilty of complicity in human rights abuses abroad, their shame-
ful and exploitative acts must be exposed, redressed, and stopped.").
15. Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corpora-
tions, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801, 802 (2002).
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in their breaches of international law. 16 Proponents of this view
would likely agree that this should be the case for financial in-
stitutions and corporations that provided significant assistance
to perpetrators of gross human rights violations, such as al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein. It is important that
a precedent be established under the ATCA for holding such
corporate actors responsible for their complicitous actions. Al-
lowing victims of human rights abuse to seek recourse in U.S.
federal courts against corporate violators of international law
may serve as a powerful deterrent to others engaged in similar
conduct. 17 Moreover, it would provide just compensation to
those victims who have found it nearly impossible to enforce
judgments against governments and their officials.' 8
This Note explores the possibility of bringing a lawsuit un-
der the ATCA against Riggs for its alleged role in financing
Chile's former military government, as well as concealing ac-
counts and laundering possibly looted money belonging to Pino-
chet. Part I details Riggs's history and involvement with Pino-
chet. 19 Part II provides a framework for understanding the
legal issues by tracing the history of the ATCA, including the
Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the statute, and dis-
cussing several key cases involving corporate liability under the
Act.20 Part III interprets the facts of the Pinochet-Riggs rela-
tionship through the legal lens provided by emerging ATCA ju-
risprudence. 2' This Note concludes that international law has
evolved to recognize that financial institutions may be held li-
able under the ATCA for financing human rights violators and
concealing and laundering funds looted by state actors.
I. THICK AS THIEVES: RIGGS'S AND PINOCHET'S LONG-
STANDING FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP
To assess Riggs's complicity in Pinochet's campaign of hu-
man rights abuses, it is important to understand the extent of
their relationship. Not only did a recent Senate Report uncover
16. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 335.
17. Symposium, The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citi-
zen, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 27 (2001).
18. See Kathryn L. Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts:
Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139,
1152-53.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part HI.
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long-standing financial links between Riggs and Pinochet,22 but
there is also significant evidence of financial ties and support
for the Pinochet dictatorship dating back to the 1970s.
23
A U.S. Senate investigation to evaluate the enforcement
and effectiveness of federal antimony-laundering provisions
24
has created an enormous scandal within the banking commu-
nity25 and within Chile.26 To conduct its evaluation, the U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations performed
a case study of Riggs,27 a multinational financial institution
headquartered in Washington, D.C. 28 Riggs, which has numer-
ous clients from foreign countries, including some with "high
risks of money laundering and foreign corruption," has a his-
tory of repeated citations for weak antimony-laundering (AML)
controls.29 The Senate Report found that since at least 1997,
"Riggs has disregarded its [AMLI obligations, maintained a
dysfunctional AML program despite frequent warnings from
[regulators with the Office of the Currency Comptroller (OCC)],
and allowed or, at times, actively facilitated suspicious finan-
cial activity."3 0
To illustrate Riggs's poor AML compliance, the Senate in-
vestigation analyzed two sets of accounts-one of which be-
longed to the former Chilean dictator, Augusto Pinochet. 31 The
report found that Riggs had "assisted Augusto Pinochet... to
evade legal proceedings related to his Riggs bank accounts and
resisted OCC oversight of the accounts, despite red flags involv-
ing the source of Mr. Pinochet's wealth, pending legal proceed-
ings to freeze his assets, and public allegations of serious
wrongdoing by this client."32
22. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
25. In May 2004, Riggs was fined $25 million for "willfully violating its
legal obligations to implement an adequate antimoney laundering program
and file currency transaction and suspicious activity reports .... This fine is
the largest ever assessed under the Bank Secrecy Act." Id. at 17.
26. Hector Tobar & Eva Vergara, The World; New Evidence Shatters
Chileans'Image of a Frugal Pinochet, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A3.
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
28. Id. at 12.
29. Id. at 15.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 12. The other set of accounts belongs to the government of
Equatorial Guinea (EG), EG government officials, or their families. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 7.
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According to the Senate Report, from 1994 to 2002, Riggs
opened at least six accounts and issued several certificates of
deposits (CDs) for Pinochet.33 Three of these accounts were per-
sonal accounts and the other three were opened in the names of
offshore shell corporations created by Riggs for Pinochet.34 In
fact, senior Riggs officials had traveled to Chile to personally
solicit Pinochet's business. 35 The aggregate deposits by Pino-
chet into these accounts ranged from $4 to $8 million.36
Among its findings, the Senate Report determined that
Riggs officials made practically no effort to inquire into the
source of Pinochet's wealth.37 Under OCC regulations, Riggs
was required to implement AML programs 38 such as a "know
your customer" (KYC) policy.39 This policy was designed to
guard against money laundering by verifying that a customer's
wealth was acquired through legitimate sources. 4 0 However, at
no time did the bank reveal in its KYC profiles on the Pinochet
accounts that the owner was involved in "ongoing controversies
and litigation associating Mr. Pinochet with human rights
abuses, corruption, arms sales, and drug trafficking,"41 nor did
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 19-20.
36. Id. at 2. According to Pinochet's sworn financial statements, he re-
ceived large commissions from services and travel abroad totaling $12.3 mil-
lion while he was dictator and head of the Chilean military. Timothy L.
O'Brien & Larry Rohter, The Pinochet Money Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004,
§ 3, at 1. However, Chilean authorities are reviewing the documents, which
were allegedly approved by the Chilean Defense Ministry, for their authentic-
ity. Id.
37. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
38. Id. at 16-17 (noting that OCC regulations have required an AML pro-
gram at nationally chartered banks since 1987); see also Terence O'Hara,
Riggs Evidence Suggests Crimes by Employees; Inquiry Implicates Former Pi-
nochet Account Managers, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at El (stating that
"[riegulations requiring documentation of 'politically exposed' bank customers
have been in force since 1986 for most banks').
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24. Of the three KYC profiles pre-
pared on Pinochet for 1998, 1999, and 2002, none identifies the owner of the
accounts as Augusto Pinochet. Id. at 25-28. Rather, the owner of the accounts
is described in one profile as a "retired professional" who held a "[h]igh paying
position in investment income" and "in the public sector." Id. at 25-26. In an-
other profile, he is described as a "retired Army General" whose sources of
wealth include "profits and dividends from several business[es] family owned"
and "investment income, rental income, and pension fund payments from pre-
vious posts." Id. at 27.
40. Id. at 24.
41. Id. at 27.
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it acknowledge the "long-standing and ongoing controversies
over the sources of [Pinochet's] wealth."
42
The report also disclosed that after an indictment was filed
in Spain in 1996 accusing Pinochet of crimes against humanity,
Riggs assisted Pinochet in creating two offshore shell corpora-
tions that same year and in 199843 in an effort to disguise his
ownership of these accounts. 44 The Senate investigation further
found that Riggs officials aided Pinochet in evading legal pro-
ceedings surrounding his arrest in London in 1998. 45 The Span-
ish magistrate who initiated the legal proceedings against Pi-
nochet issued an attachment order in October 1998 "against all
bank accounts held directly or indirectly by Mr. Pinochet, his
family members, or third parties in any country."46 Six months
after the attachment order was issued, Riggs allowed Pinochet
to transfer $1.6 million from a CD held in London to a new CD
in the United States.47 A memorandum provided to the bank
and obtained during the investigation revealed that "senior
Riggs officials were fully aware of the Pinochet attachment or-
der and seizure actions taking place in other countries, the
questions about the source of Mr. Pinochet's wealth, and the al-
legations of his involvement with a variety of crimes."48 At no
point did Riggs "file any suspicious activity reports that would
have alerted British or U.S. law enforcement to the existence of
the Pinochet funds."49
42. Id. at 26.
43. Id. at 20.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 29. Pinochet was arrested in London in October 1998 on charges
of murder, torture, hostage taking, and conspiracy to commit those crimes.
MADELEINE DAvIs, THE PINOCHET CASE 1 (2000). The warrant for his arrest
requested his extradition to Spain to stand trial for the alleged crimes. Id. The
House of Lords ultimately decided that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain
to answer charges for a limited number of the alleged crimes. Id. However, the
British Home Secretary ruled that Pinochet was mentally unfit to stand trial
and allowed him to return to Chile in March 2000 after seventeen months. Id.
46. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id. at 29. In response to a report in a British newspaper in December
2000 that Pinochet had more than $1 million in an account at Riggs in the
United States, Riggs made further efforts to disguise Pinochet's accounts. See
id. at 30. Shortly thereafter, Riggs changed the official names on the personal
account controlled by Pinochet from "Augusto Pinochet Ugarte & Lucia Hiriart
de Pinochet" to '. Hiriart &/or A. Ugarte" so that any search for the name
"Pinochet" would be unable to identify the accounts. Id. at 30-31.
15032005]
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The investigation further revealed that "Riggs did not, at
any time, volunteer information about the Pinochet accounts
either to a bank examiner or to law enforcement."50 Instead,
Riggs hid its relationship with Pinochet from OCC examiners. 51
In July 2000, when asked by the OCC to provide it with a "list
of accounts controlled by foreign political figures, Riggs omitted
the Pinochet accounts from that list."52 Only when the OCC ini-
tiated a "targeted examination of the Pinochet accounts" in
2002 did Riggs finally agree to cooperate.5 3
The Senate Report also points out that Riggs's relationship
with Pinochet began before 1994. One of Riggs's KYC profiles
on a Pinochet account stated that Pinochet had been a cus-
tomer of the bank since 1985.54 Prior to that, one news account
indicates that Pinochet had used Citibank; in 1984, however,
Citibank requested that Pinochet close his account because the
bank no longer wanted to do business with him.55
Other reports reveal that both Chilean military officials
and Chilean government agencies have had long-standing ac-
counts with Riggs. 56 Among those who maintained ties with
Riggs was Manuel Contreras, the former head of the Director-
ate of National Intelligence (DINA),57 the Chilean secret policy
agency created during Pinochet's dictatorship.58 Contreras had
two accounts at Riggs in Washington, D.C. 9 One account was a
personal account, which was opened in 1966,60 and the other
was a service account for DINA, which was active as early as
1975,61 and disguised under a fictitious company name.62 Un-
der the direction of Pinochet and Contreras, DINA's operations
expanded to include "organizing acts of international terrorism
50. Id. at 35.
51. See id. at 3, 34.
52. Id. at 35.
53. Id. at 3, 35-36.
54. Id. at 19 n.38, 25. Riggs did not provide any account opening docu-
mentation for an account controlled by Pinochet prior to 1994. See id. at 19
n.38.
55. O'Brien & Rohter, supra note 36.
56. Glenn R. Simpson, Ex-Executive at Riggs Is Focus of Probe into Bank's
Pinochet Ties, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at A2.
57. KORNBLUH, supra note 7, at 224.
58. Id. at 165.
59. Id. at 224.
60. O'Brien & Rohter, supra note 36.
61. KORNBLUH, supra note 7, at 224.
62. Id.
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against prominent exiles," 63 including the terrorist attack
against a former Chilean ambassador in Washington, D.C. in
1976.64
Other news accounts indicate that Riggs provided financ-
ing to Chile in the form of loans during the late 1970s and pos-
sibly into the 1980s. 65 In fact, a coalition of human rights
groups began a campaign against Riggs to encourage those do-
ing business with its banks to withdraw in part because of
Riggs's relationship with the military government of Chile.
66
One report noted that Riggs had "extended at least $38 million
worth of credits to the military missions of the Chilean dicta-
torship" during the 1970s. 67
Much remains unknown about the extent of Riggs's finan-
cial relationship with Pinochet and his former government. 68 In
February 2005, however, Riggs agreed to settle a lawsuit
brought against it in a Spanish court for allegedly concealing
assets and committing money-laundering offenses. 69 Under the
terms of the settlement, Riggs will pay victims of Pinochet's re-
gime $8 million.7 0 This announcement came only a month after
Riggs entered a guilty plea to federal criminal charges in the
United States for failing to report suspicious financial transac-
63. Id. at 175.
64. See Timothy S. Robinson, Letelier Murder Suspect Shifted $25,000
from D.C. Bank, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1979, at A3.
65. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
66. Bredemeier, supra note 8; Dickey, supra note 8.
67. Dickey, supra note 8.
68. Investigations in Chile are looking into the Riggs scandal, including
the source of Pinochet's wealth. See Kathleen Day & Pascale Bonnefoy, Pino-
chet Loses Immunity in Chile: Ruling May Lead to Human Rights Trials,
WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2004, at A14; Eva Vergara, Chilean Judge Questions
Gen. Augusto Pinochet About Former Dictator's U.S. Bank Accounts,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 20, 2004), at http://start.localnet.com/article.php?
article=D84JAQEOO.html. The U.S. Justice Department is also conducting an
investigation into Riggs based on the information revealed in the Senate Re-
port. See Kathleen Day, Criminal Probe of Riggs Bank Underway: Justice De-
partment Is Looking into Officers, Directors, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2004, at El.
69. Saul Hansell, Riggs National Will Settle Spanish Suit Linked to Pino-
chet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2005, at C4. The settlement arises out of charges
brought against Pinochet in 1997 by the same Spanish judge who was respon-
sible for Pinochet's arrest in London in 1998. Terence O'Hara, Allbrittons,
Riggs to Pay Victims of Pinochet; Settlement Ends Case in Spain, WASH. POST,
Feb. 26, 2005, at Al.
70. O'Hara, supra note 69. Two bank directors of Riggs have also agreed
to pay an additional $1 million. Id.
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tions involving, among others, Pinochet's accounts. 71 In light of
both these developments and other information that has sur-
faced regarding Riggs's role in concealing and laundering po-
tentially looted assets and financing Pinochet's brutal dictator-
ship, an exploration of the ATCA's evolving jurisprudence can
help determine Riggs's possible liability under the Act.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS COUP: BACKGROUND ON THE
REDISCOVERY OF THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
Originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the
ATCA is one of the United States' oldest statutes,72 yet it is
relatively new in terms of the courts defining the ATCA's
meaning and applicability.73 The Act itself comprises a single
sentence that has changed little since its adoption: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States."74 Despite its apparent
simplicity, during the first 190 years of its existence, the ATCA
was invoked fewer than twenty-two times,75 and jurisdiction
was upheld only twice under the statute.76 Then, in 1980, the
Second Circuit decided the landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,77 which brought this unknown statute out of obscurity,
providing a powerful new weapon to those demanding account-
ability for human rights abuses around the world.78
71. Eric Dash, Riggs Bank Is Penalized $16 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2005, at C4. To avoid prosecution, Riggs will pay a penalty of at least $16 mil-
lion. Id.
72. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
73. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; cf. § 9(b), 1 Stat. at 77 (establishing that federal dis-
trict courts "shall ... have cognizance... of all causes where an alien sues for
a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States").
75. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, International Impli-
cations of the Alien Tort Statute, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 245, 248 (2004) (citing
Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Claims: Inquiry
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4 n.15 (1985)).
76. Id. (citing Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v.
Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795)).
77. 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 946-48, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2002)(recognizing that a claim alleging forced labor, murder, and rape may be
brought under the ATCA against a defendant corporation), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that allegation of war
crimes and genocide may be brought under the ATCA against a nonstate ac-
1506 [89:1497
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Filartiga held that two citizens of Paraguay could sue the
perpetrator of state-sanctioned torture, which occurred in
Paraguay, for the wrongful death of their relative in U.S. fed-
eral courts under the ATCA. 79 The elements of an ATCA claim
had been met: (1) the plaintiffs were aliens; (2) the claim was
for a tort; and (3) the tort was committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.80 In holding "that
deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights,"8' the Second Circuit declared that the ATCA
not only provides subject matter jurisdiction but that it also
recognizes a private cause of action regarding violations of in-
ternational law.8 2
In the quarter of a century since the Second Circuit an-
nounced this precedent-setting decision, plaintiffs have been
pushing the limits of the ATCA in terms of both advocating a
broad interpretation of the meaning of the "law of nations" and
bringing actions against a variety of defendants. Cases ranging
from allegations of torture83 and genocide84 to terrorism financ-
ing8 5 and forced labor 86 have all been asserted under the ATCA.
Similarly, the list of those sued under the ATCA has expanded
tor); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 884 (concluding that allegations of official tor-
ture may be brought under the ATCA by citizens of Paraguay against a state
official); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99-100
(D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the ATCA recognizes a cause of action for viola-
tions of international law, including aircraft hijacking).
79. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
80. Id. at 887.
81. Id. at 878. The Second Circuit relied in part on the United Nations
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture to reach its deci-
sion. Id. at 881-83. Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act "to cod-
ify the cause of action recognized... in Fil[a]rtiga, and to further extend that
cause of action to plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens." Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241.
82. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878, 887.
83. Id. at 884 ("[W]e conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the
law of nations.").
84. Kadic, 70 F.3d. at 241 ("In the aftermath of the atrocities committed
during the Second World War, the condemnation of genocide... quickly
achieved broad acceptance by the community of nations.").
85. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91
(D.D.C. 2003).
86. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Forced labor
is a modern variant of slavery to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability such that state action is not required."), reh'g en banc granted, Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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from primarily state actors8 7 to private individuals,88 and in-
creasingly to multinational corporations.8 9
While some courts have supported the expansion of the
scope of liability under the ATCA,90 not all courts have agreed
with this broad approach to the ATCA's reach.91 In particular,
disagreement exists as to whether the ATCA recognizes a cause
of action or is purely a jurisdictional statute. The Second, Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits reflected the majority view that
the ATCA recognizes a cause of action for any alien seeking
damages for tortlike injuries caused by a violation of interna-
tional law.92 Judges on the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
statute is primarily a jurisdictional grant to federal courts that
allows plaintiffs to allege only violations of international law
recognized in 1789. 93
Thus, the threshold question is whether the ATCA recog-
nizes a cause of action at all. If it does, which claims are to be
recognized as violations of the laws of nations? Finally, it is es-
sential to ATCA jurisprudence to determine who may be sued
under the Act.
A. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAN: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
WEIGHS IN
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to resolve part
of the debate over whether the ATCA provides for actionable
87. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
88. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
89. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 77 Fed. Appx. 48, 50-51 (2d Cir. 2003);
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945-46; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman En-
ergy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
90. See, e.g., Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; Burnett, 274
F. Supp. 2d at 91.
91. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145-49 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (Randolph, J., concurring); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); id. at 826 (Robb, J., concur-
ring).
92. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003);
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999); Abebe-
Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
93. See, e.g., Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1145-49 (Randolph, J., concurring)
(reasoning that the ATCA confers only jurisdiction and that it does not recog-
nize causes of action except those recognized in 1789); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
806 (Bork, J., concurring) (concluding that the ATCA grants federal courts ju-
risdiction to hear cases alleging violations of the "law of nations" as the term
was understood in 1789).
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claims, and if so, which actions violate the law of nations.94
Sosa v. Alvarez-MachainM95 involved a claim alleging arbitrary
detention brought under the ATCA by Dr. Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican national, against the U.S. government and
Francisco Sosa, a Mexican policeman.96 Sosa helped the federal
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) kidnap Alvarez-Machain
from his office in Mexico and bring him to the United States to
stand trial for the murder of a DEA agent.97 Alvarez-Machain
was ultimately acquitted of the charges.9 8 Sosa, with the sup-
port of the U.S. government, argued that the ATCA is a juris-
dictional statute only, which does not create or authorize the
federal courts to recognize any causes of action without further
legislative action.99 While the Court ultimately ruled that Alva-
rez-Machain did not have a viable claim under the ATCA, it
more importantly denied Sosa's interpretation, thus allowing
for the recognition of other claims under the statute. 100
To arrive at this conclusion, the Court reviewed the legisla-
tive history of the ATCA.101 It noted that when Congress en-
acted the ATCA in 1789, it "gave the district courts 'cognizance'
of certain causes of action" in terms of "a grant of jurisdiction,
not power to mold substantive law." 10 2 However, the Court
pointed out that federal courts had the authority to hear com-
mon law claims, such as torts in violation of the law of nations,
once there was a statute granting jurisdiction. 10 3 Adding that
the United States was "bound to receive the law of nations" at
the time of its independence,10 4 the Court noted that the law of
nations covered "general norms governing the behavior of na-
tional states with each other" and "a body of judge-made law
regulating the conduct of individuals situated outside domestic
boundaries."'105 It emphasized that three particular violations
against the law of nations would likely have been the common
law claims the drafters of the ATCA were thinking of in 1789:
94. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754-67 (2004).
95. Id. at 2739.
96. Id. at 2746-47, 2767.
97. Id. at 2746.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2754.
100. Id. at 2761-62.
101. Id. at 2755.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing Brief for Vikram Amar et al. as amici curiae).
104. Id. (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796)).
105. Id. at 2756.
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"violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambas-
sadors, and piracy."'106
As further support for this interpretation, the Supreme
Court cited a resolution passed in 1781 by the Continental
Congress encouraging state legislatures to enact laws punish-
ing specific offenses, including breaches of treaties and conven-
tions to which the United States was a party, violations of safe
conducts, and infringement on the rights of ambassadors. 107
The Continental Congress further recommended that the states
"authorise [sic] suits ... for damages by the party injured, and
for compensation to the United States for damage sustained by
them from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen." 108
While some scholars have argued that this resolution is the ba-
sis for the ATCA,109 it, at the very least, signals Congress's
"commitment to enforce the law of nations.""l 0
Yet because there is no record of the congressional debate
nor an enumeration of which private actions were subject to the
ATCA, no general agreement exists as to what Congress in-
tended."' Despite this lack of consensus, the Supreme Court
concluded that history did not support the interpretation that
Congress created a jurisdictional statute that was "stillborn,"112
having no "practical effect."'113 Rather, the Court noted that the
first Congress "intended the [ATCA] to furnish jurisdiction for
a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law
of nations." 1 4 These actions are not limited to the three histori-
cal violations of international law. 115 Instead, the Court deter-
mined that the federal common law provides the basis for creat-
ing new common law causes of action based on the federal
courts' ability to incorporate the law of nations into the federal
common law. 116 Upon reaching this decision, the Court empha-
106. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 68 (1769)).
107. Id. at 2756-57 (citing 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG.
1136-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)).
108. Id. at 2757 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONG. 1137
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)).
109. Burley, supra note 12, at 476-77.
110. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2757.
111. Id. at 2758.
112. Id. at 2755.
113. Id. at 2758.
114. Id. at 2759.
115. Id. at 2764.
116. Id. at 2761-62, 2764.
1510 [89:1497
TAKING RIGGS SERIOUSLY
sized that for two centuries, federal courts "have affirmed that
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of na-
tions."117 It underscored this point by acknowledging that its
decision with regard to the ATCA aligns itself with the position
the federal courts have taken since the Second Circuit decided
Filartiga."8 Adding further support to its conclusion, the Court
highlighted the fact that Congress had done nothing to indicate
that the law of nations should be set aside.119
The Court also emphasized that federal courts "should re-
quire any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest
on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized."'120 To make
this determination, ATCA claims should be "gauged against the
current state of international law" by examining certain
sources, including treaties, executive and legislative acts, judi-
cial opinions, and works by jurists and commentators. 121
Moreover, the Court encouraged the exercise of "judicial
caution" for a number of reasons, including the substantial de-
gree of discretion involved in recognizing common law claims
based on internationally generated norms, as well as the
changes since 1789 in the role of courts in making federal
common law. 122 It also noted that the "general practice has
been to look for legislative guidance before exercising innova-
tive authority over substantive law"'123 and to leave the creation
of private causes of action in most cases up to the legislative
117. Id. at 2764.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 2765; see also Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach
of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 249, 256 (2004) (noting that
Congress has imposed no limitations on the ATCA's reach, "including limits as
to subject matter, its extraterritorial reach, or its provision of a cause of action
or right to a remedy" (citation omitted)). As recently as 1991, Congress reaf-
firmed its support of the ATCA's broad scope by stating that the ATCA "should
remain intact to permit suits based on... norms that already exist or may
ripen in the future into rules of customary international law." See id. at 256
n.19 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4 (1991)). Congress also ex-
pressed its support for the Second Circuit's interpretation of the ATCA in its
Filartiga decision. S. REP. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991) (noting that "the Filartiga
case has met with general approval").
120. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
121. Id. at 2766-67 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
122. Id. at 2762.
123. Id.
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arena. 124 The Court further cautioned federal courts to consider
the potential consequences of recognizing new violations of in-
ternational law on U.S. foreign relations and the role of the ex-
ecutive and legislative bodies in conducting such affairs. 125
While the Court's opinion in Sosa clarifies that certain vio-
lations of international law can result in a viable cause of ac-
tion under the ATCA, it remains up to the lower federal courts
to determine which violations of international law will be ac-
tionable. 126 Legal scholars have argued that the standards of
international law continue to evolve "with the international
community and its consciousness." 127 Under this theory, the
scope of the ATCA's reach may arguably continue to expand as
well. 128 While Sosa sets a high bar for establishing interna-
tional law-based causes of action under the ATCA, there is gen-
eral agreement that certain acts such as torture, summary exe-
cution, war crimes, genocide and slavery are internationally
denounced and widely considered violations of the law of na-
tions. 129 This list, however, is not exclusive, and arguments
may be made to recognize other actions as violations of interna-
tional law.130 Two such arguments will be explored later in this
Note concerning corporate liability under the ATCA. 131
B. UNANSWERED QUESTION: WHO CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER
THE ATCA?
Another question regarding the scope of the ATCA is who
can be sued under the Act. This has become an increasingly de-
bated topic as plaintiffs have filed ATCA claims against not
only state actors and individuals for violations of international
law, but also multinational corporations. 132 Unfortunately,
124. Id. at 2762-63.
125. Id. at 2763.
126. Id. at 2764.
127. Boyd, supra note 18, at 1149-50.
128. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995).
129. See Laura Bowersett, Doe v. Unocal: -Torturous Decision for Multina-
tionals Doing Business in Politically Unstable Environments, 11 TRANSNAr'L
LAW. 361, 372 (1998).
130. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764.
131. See infra Part III.A-B.
132. Linda Greenhouse, Human Rights Abuses Worldwide Are Held to Fall
Under U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A21 (noting that interna-
tional business interests "have been alarmed by increasing use of the [ATCA]
to sue multinational corporations for human rights violations").
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Sosa, which involved defendant state actors, shed little light on
this debate.133
Under what some scholars describe as the "traditional
view" of international law, only states are considered relevant
actors. 34 Proponents of such a view believe that international
law binds only states and does not place obligations on private
nonstate actors. 135 However, an alternative approach views the
international community as "compris[ing] not only states, but
individuals, peoples, inter-governmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations, and corporations."136 Some schol-
ars argue that the Nuremberg trials held in the aftermath of
World War II established the notion of individual accountabil-
ity for human rights violations under international law.137
In 1995, the Second Circuit recognized this notion of indi-
vidual accountability when it extended its Filartiga precedent
for trying state actors under the ATCA to private individu-
als.138 In Kadic v. Karadzic,139 Croat and Muslim citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina brought a lawsuit under the ATCA against
Radovan Karadzic, then-president of the self-proclaimed Bos-
nian-Serb republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, alleging that he
had directed a campaign of human rights violations, which in-
cluded genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.140
Karadzic argued he was not a state actor nor was he acting un-
der color of a state's law, and thus he could not be bound by in-
ternational law.' 4 ' The Second Circuit disagreed and held "that
133. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746. In a footnote, the Court simply points out
that a "consideration [under the ATCA] is whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual."
Id. at 2766 n.20.
134. Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 415, 417 (2000); see also Boyd, supra note 18, at 1148.
135. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 398.
136. Byers, supra note 134, at 418 (emphasis added).
137. See, e.g., Jodi Thorp, Welcome Ex-Dictators, Torturers and Tyrants:
Comparative Approaches to Handling Ex-Dictators and Past Human Rights
Abuses, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 167, 169 (2002); see also Ramasastry, supra note 12,
at 401 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae, the International Human Rights Law
Group and Professors Deborah Anker, David Bederman, Richard Falk, Joan
Fitzpatrick, Paul Kahn, Cynthia Lichtenstein, Richard Lillich, Oscar
Shachter, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Henry Steiner at 9, Doe v. Karadzic, 866
F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. Civ. 93-0878)).
138. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
139. Id. at 232.
140. Id. at 236-37.
141. Id. at 239.
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certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether un-
dertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only
as private individuals."'' 42 Although the court focused on the
modern era's interpretation of the law of nations, 143 it cited pi-
rates as an early example of nonstate actors who could be held
liable for offenses against international law. 144 It further noted
that nonstate actors may be held liable for other violations of
international law such as war crimes and genocide even when
there is no state involvement because these crimes are of inter-
national concern, and thus subject to universal jurisdiction. 145
However, the court concluded that certain actions such as tor-
ture or summary execution violate international law only when
committed by state officials or under color of law, unless they
are carried out in furtherance of one of the offenses subject to
universal jurisdiction such as genocide or war crimes. 146 A non-
state actor "acts under color of law. .. when he acts together
with state officials or with significant state aid."'147
Kadic's recognition of claims against private actors under
the ATCA inevitably led to one of the most controversial issues
surrounding the Act: whether corporations can be held liable
for violations of international law. Although to date no corpo-
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844) (ob-
serving that pirates were "hostis humani generis" (an enemy of all mankind)
because they acted "without... any pretense of public authority")).
145. Id. at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404
(1987)). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 404 states that:
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of univer-
sal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of air-
craft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism,
even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is pre-
sent.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).
146. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions § 702 states that:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d)
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention, (f) systematic racial discrimi-
nation, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1987).
147. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982)).
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rate defendant has been found liable for tortious violations of
international law under the ATCA, 148 numerous lawsuits have
been filed under the statute against multinational corporations
and financial institutions alleging violations of human
rights.149 Some legal scholars attribute this recent phenomenon
to the increased scrutiny of nonstate actors, including corpora-
tions, under international law. 150 This trend finds support in
the argument that a corporation is "simply a juridic person,"
who is bound by domestic and international laws applicable to
individuals. 151 Thus, corporations must avoid directly infring-
ing on human dignity. 152 Because the idea of complicity exists
in international law, private actors and states have a duty not
to engage in complicitous behavior, which violates human
rights.153 Therefore, corporations are obligated "not to cooper-
ate with [a] government when it is violating human
rights... ."154 Some legal scholars have emphasized that a
number of conventions, declarations, and documents of interna-
tional organizations provide support for the proposition that
corporations have obligations under international law, includ-
ing upholding human rights 155
148. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, supra note 75, at 253.
149. E.g., Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2d Cir. 2002) (rec-
ognizing an ATCA claim against a defendant oil company but dismissing the
case on forum non conveniens grounds); Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273
F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing a corporate defendant but dismissing
the ATCA claim against defendant as barred by previous litigation); Presbyte-
rian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding an ATCA claim brought against a Canadian energy
company alleged to have collaborated with the Sudanese government); Burger-
Fischer v. DeGussa Ag, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 282, 285 (D.N.J. 1999) (recogniz-
ing that the court had subject matter jurisdiction regarding an ATCA claim
against two German corporations but dismissing the claim on justiciability
grounds).
150. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 18, at 1143; Ramasastry, supra note 12, at
330.
151. See Paust, supra note 15, at 803.
152. Symposium, supra note 17, at 29.
153. Id. at 28.
154. Id. at 30.
155. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 15, passim; see also Mark B. Baker, Tight-
ening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational
Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 89, 119-29 (2001). As early as 1945, the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg included provisions con-
cerning groups and organizations involved in criminal activities. Paust, supra
note 15, at 803 n.4 (citing Charter of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremburg, Aug. 8, 1945, arts. 9-10, 82 U.N.T.S. 279). The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights further recognized that human rights are "a common
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ATCA jurisprudence reflects this trend by recognizing that
corporations can be held liable under the Act for human rights
violations even when another actor such as a state commits the
offensive acts. 15 6 Legal scholars have posited that theories of
aiding and abetting, joint venture, agency, negligence, and
recklessness "could be used to link all sorts of relationships
that a corporation may have with government officials, gov-
ernment agencies, and state enterprises."'157
One particular area of corporate liability under the ATCA
that has not been thoroughly explored is the issue of bank se-
crecy and financing. The question remains whether multina-
tional banks that knowingly conceal looted assets in accounts,
launder money, and provide financing can be held accountable
under the ATCA for aiding and abetting state actors who have
standard of achievement for ... every individual and every organ of society,"
id. at 811 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res.
217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)), and that no "group or per-
son... [is] to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the de-
struction of any of the rights and freedoms" in this Declaration, id. at 811-12
(quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 30, G.A. Res. 217A, 3
U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). The preamble to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights states "that the individual ... is under a re-
sponsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recog-
nized" in the Covenant. Id. at 813 (emphasis omitted) (quoting International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)). The United Nations also drafted a
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations calling on such companies to
"respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries in which
they operate." Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, art. 14,
U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). In 1976, the Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, which includes thirty member countries, adopted the
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises to
provide guidelines for corporate behavior in the international community.
Baker, supra, at 119-20 (citing Padideh Ala'i, The Legacy of Geographical Mo-
rality and Colonialism: A Historical Assessment of the Current Crusade
Against Corruption, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 877, 922-23 (2000)).
156. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946-47, 952-54 (9th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing that a claim alleging forced labor, murder, and rape may be
brought under the ATCA against a defendant corporation), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 472-73 (2d Cir. 2002); Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (upholding
an ATCA claim brought against a Canadian energy company alleged to have
collaborated with the Sudan government to commit gross human rights viola-
tions); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1092, 1094 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (upholding an ATCA claim brought against a Bolivian corporation for
conspiring with state officials to arbitrarily detain the plaintiff).
157. Elliot J. Schrage, Judging Corporate Accountability in the Global
Economy, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153, 159 (2003).
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committed serious breaches of international law. To provide a
response, it must be determined whether these actions violate
the law of nations. Four cases examined below provide possible
insight into answering this question and analyzing the more
specific question of whether Riggs may be held liable under
ATCA for aiding and abetting Pinochet's campaign of atrocities.
C. MARCOS HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: SWISS BANKS
AS AGENTS
The human rights litigation brought against former Fili-
pino President Marcos was the first ATCA case to recognize
Swiss banks as "agents" of human rights violators who were
also their customers. 158 During the presidency of Ferdinand
Marcos, the Filipino military acting under martial law alleg-
edly tortured, murdered, and forced the disappearances of as
many as 10,000 people in the Philippines.159 After Marcos fled
to Hawaii in response to a democratic uprising in the Philip-
pines, 160 individuals alleging to have been tortured by his gov-
ernment and family members of such victims of abuse brought
lawsuits against Marcos under the ATCA. 161 Five cases were
ultimately filed against him, 162 and although Marcos died in
1989, the lawsuits continued against his estate.
163
A judicial panel consolidated the various cases against the
estate in 1990, resulting in a class action lawsuit in 1991.164 In
January 1995, a federal district court awarded the Marcos
plaintiffs $1.9 billion in damages 165 for human rights viola-
tions. 166 Almost two years later, the court ordered the Swiss
banks, holding an estimated $475 million of Marcos's assets, 167
to turn the money over to the plaintiffs to partially satisfy the
judgment against the Marcos estate.168 Upon issuing this in-
158. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 430, 435.
159. In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 331.
163. Id.
164. Marcos, 25 F.3d. at 1469.
165. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 433 (citing Dictators Beware: Torture
Victims May Finally See Money From the Marcos Vaults, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 13,
1995, at 48).
166. Id. at 430.
167. Id. at 434.
168. Id. (citing In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D. Haw.
1995)).
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junction, the district court characterized the banks as "agents"
of Marcos. 169 The Swiss banks appealed the district court ruling
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,170 arguing that enforce-
ment of the injunction by a U.S. court would "conflict with
Swiss criminal law, Swiss sovereignty, and international
law."'17 The Ninth Circuit, while acknowledging the district
court judge's characterization of the banks as "agents" of Mar-
cos, reversed the decision because the banks were not parties in
the original lawsuits.172
In response to the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Marcos
plaintiffs made another attempt to enforce the judgment by fil-
ing a lawsuit directly against the Swiss banks. 173 In their com-
plaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the "Swiss banks have laun-
dered and invested the assets of Ferdinand E. Marcos for
decades." 174 They argued that the banks, as "agents" of Marcos,
had played "an active role in concealing and disguising the as-
sets."'175 When the defendant Swiss banks petitioned the Ninth
Circuit for writ of mandamus, 176 the court responded by invok-
ing the act of state doctrine, 177 which precludes U.S. courts
from examining the validity of a sovereign nation's public acts
committed in its own territory, 78 and dismissed the lawsuit. 179
169. Id. at 435 (quoting Plaintiffs/Real Parties in Interest Response in Op-
position to Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Prohibition and/or
Other Extraordinary Relief at 1, Credit Suisse v. United States Dist. Ct., Cent.
Dist. of Calif., 130 F.3d 1342 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-70193)).
170. Id.
171. See id. (citing Henry Weinstein, Swiss Threaten Retaliation Over L.A.
Judges's Order in Marcos Case; Courts: U.S. Seeks to Pacify Individuals Who
Complained About Ruling That They Should Turn Over $475 Million Linked
to Dictator, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, at A3).
172. Id. at 436 (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir.
1996)).
173. Id. at 439.
174. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs/Real Parties in Interest Response in Opposition
to Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 1, Credit Suisse (No. 97-
70193)). During his presidency, Marcos, who had used pseudonyms and shell
corporations to disguise his Swiss accounts, id. at 431, maintained control over
the Philippine Treasury, id. (citing STERLING SEAGRAVE, THE MARCOS
DYNASTY 194-95 (1988)). Evidence indicates that Marcos looted government
money by transferring such monies to secret personal accounts. Id. (citing
Pieter J. Hoets & Sara G. Zwart, Swiss Bank Secrecy and the Marcos Affair, 9
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 75, 83 (1988)).
175. Id. at 440 (quoting [Proposed] Second Am. Compl. at 10-11, Tizon v.
Credit Suisse (D. Haw. 1997) (MDL No. 840)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 441 (citing Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d at 1346).
178. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The act of state doc-
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However, at the end of 1997, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court
ordered the Swiss banks to release the Marcos assets to the
Philippine government, 80 which had announced that it would
negotiate a settlement with 10,000 human rights victims.'
8
'
D. HOLOCAUST LITIGATION: APPLYING NUREMBERG PRINCIPLES
TO ATCA CLAIMS AGAINST Swiss BANKS
While the Marcos litigation was significant in terms of
raising the issue of third-party liability for banks under the
ATCA, it was the Holocaust litigation against certain Swiss
banks during the 1990s that opened the door to bringing ATCA
claims against financial institutions alleged to have concealed
bank accounts, laundered money, and financed governments
responsible for human rights atrocities. By making claims of
economic and property rights under the ATCA, the Holocaust
plaintiffs helped further an expansion of the substantive hu-
man rights recognized by international law. ' 8
2
During the mid-1990s, Holocaust survivors and relatives of
Holocaust victims filed several class action lawsuits against
Swiss banks.'8 3 The Holocaust plaintiffs claimed that the Swiss
banks:
knowingly aided and abetted the Nazi regime by providing them with
the financing necessary to continue World War II for at least a year
longer than it otherwise might have lasted; that the banks knowingly
engaged in transactions with the Nazi regime that furthered criminal
activities; [and] that the banks knowingly accepted and disposed of
assets they knew, or should have known, were the result of looting,
plunder and slave labor engaged in by or on behalf of the Nazi re-
gime.184
trine is based on the notion that "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own terri-
tory." Id.
179. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 440-41 (citing Credit Suisse, 130 F.3d
at 1346).
180. Id. at 441 (citing Judgment by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court,
1A.87/1997/err, In re Federal Office for Police Matter v. District Attorney's Of-
fice IV for the Canton of Zurich, Dec. 10, 1997).
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. See Boyd, supra note 18, at 1179.
183. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 332 (citing Friedman v. Union Bank of
Switz., No. 96-CV-5161 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996); Weisshaus v. Union Bank of
Switz., No. 96-CV-4849 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1996); World Council of Orthodox
Jewish Cmtys., Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 97-CV-0461 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 1997)).
184. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 391 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject
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In particular, they argued that the ATCA and international law
recognized their claims of human rights violations, 8 5 and that
among the torts committed by the banks was the tort of conver-
sion based in part upon the Swiss banks' involvement in the
use and concealment of Holocaust victims' assets looted by the
Nazis. 186
To support these allegations, the Holocaust plaintiffs ar-
gued that the banks had violated "international treaties, cus-
tomary international laws, and fundamental human rights
laws prohibiting genocide, war crimes, crimes against human-
ity, crimes against peace, slavery, slave and forced labor and
slave trade."'18 7 In response to the banks' argument that they
had not violated any international norms existing during the
1930s and 1940s, 188 the Holocaust plaintiffs invoked the Nur-
emberg Principles, which are "widely considered to encapsulate
principles of customary international law" during that time. 89
In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the Swiss banks aided
and abetted the commission of war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the Nuremberg Principles.190
However, because modern theories of collective liability
had not been developed at the time the Nuremberg Principles
were formulated, the Holocaust plaintiffs faced serious hurdles
in proving their claims.' 9 ' Both the Holocaust plaintiffs and the
Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim under International Law
at 49, Weisshaus (No. CV-96-4849)).
185. Id. at 387.
186. Id. at 390. "Conversion is defined under the Restatement of Torts
(Second) as 'an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which
so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may
be justly required to pay the other the full value of the chattel."' Id. at 391
(quoting 18 AM. JUR. 2D Conversion § 1 (1996)).
187. Id. (quoting Friedman, No. 96-CV-5161, 215 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1996)
[hereinafter Freidman Compl.]). The Holocaust plaintiffs, in support of their
arguments that the Swiss banks violated international law, cited the follow-
ing: the Genocide Convention; the United Nations Charter; the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights; the Geneva Convention of 1929; the supplemental
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Non-Combatants During War Time;
the Nuremberg Principles; the Slavery Convention of 1926; the Supplemen-
tary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery; the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery; the International Labor Conventions and
Recommendations; the Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights; and
the Hague Convention of 1907. Id. at 391 n.313.
188. Id. at 393-94.
189. Id. at 396-97.
190. Id. at 397.
191. Id. at 409.
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Swiss banks looked to the actions of German bankers and in-
dustrialists convicted by the U.S. Military Tribunal (USMT) to
support their respective cases. 192 In particular, the plaintiffs
cited the case of a private German banker, who was convicted
for his active role in looting and plundering,193 and the case of
another German banker, who was convicted for directing a
"Nazi program of spoliation and transfer of assets."'194 While
such actions may have constituted a war crime because they
involved "a systematic program of plunder,"'195 not all looting
convictions before the tribunal involved systematic plunder.
196
The Holocaust plaintiffs pointed to the trial of a German indus-
trialist who was convicted for the "unlawful retention of ille-
gally seized [private] property"'197 in occupied territory. 198 Ar-
guably, by accepting and managing the plundered property, the
industrialist's actions were comparable to that of the Swiss
banks which accepted and managed illegally seized assets from
the Nazis. 199
In the end, the validity of these claims was never fully ad-
judicated. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 1998,
in which the defendant Swiss banks agreed to pay $1.25 billion
to the Holocaust plaintiffs in exchange for a release of claims by
the plaintiffs relating to the Holocaust, World War II, and tar-
gets of Nazi persecution.200 The court never ruled on the banks'
pending motions to dismiss, and thus never resolved the ques-
tions concerning the scope of the ATCA's reach with regard to
these claims.
E. DOE V. UNOCAL: HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE
Six years after the Holocaust plaintiffs settled their claims
against the Swiss banks, a landmark settlement of an ATCA
claim brought against a U.S. corporation 201 was tentatively
192. Seeid. at 413.
193. Id. at 416.
194. Id. at 418.
195. Id. at 426.
196. See id. at 425-26.
197. Id. at 426.
198. Id. at 422.
199. See id.
200. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
201. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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reached. 20 2 This announcement came six months after the Su-
preme Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and shortly be-
fore the full Ninth Circuit was to review whether human rights
claims made by residents of Myanmar against a private corpo-
ration, Unocal, were viable under the ATCA.203 The plaintiffs
alleged that Unocal, an American oil company, aided and abet-
ted the Myanmar military in subjecting the plaintiffs to tor-
ture, rape, murder, and forced labor during the construction of
a gas pipeline in Myanmar.204 A three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit had previously held in this case that a claim alleging a
theory of corporate complicity was actionable under the
ATCA.205 Although this decision was ultimately vacated for re-
view by the full Ninth Circuit, it is illustrative of how a court
might rule on a similar case in the future.
Upon beginning its analysis of the plaintiffs' claims, the
three-judge panel held that all the torts alleged by the plain-
tiffs, including forced labor, murder, rape, and torture, were
violations of the law of nations. 206 The court then extended the
approach of Kadic, which found private individuals liable under
the ATCA, to private corporate entities.207 In doing so, it held
that Unocal "may be liable under the ATCA for aiding and
abetting the Myanmar Military in subjecting Plaintiffs to
forced labor" and that the standard for testing this claim under
the ATCA is "knowing practical assistance or encouragement
that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime."208 The court pointed to evidence suggesting Unocal had
202. Edward Alden & Doug Cameron, Unocal Pays Out in Burma Abuse
Case, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at 6.
203. Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims; The El Segundo Firm
Agrees to Pay to End a Landmark Case Brought by Villagers Claiming Abuses
by Troops Along A Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at Al.
204. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 936.
205. Id. at 954. Claims made by the plaintiffs against the Myanmar mili-
tary and the state-owned oil company, Myanmar Oil, had been dismissed ear-
lier by the district court under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id. at
943 (citing Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Ca. 1997)).
206. Id. at 954.
207. Id. at 946. The court first noted that slave trading was included on a
narrow list of crimes, such as genocide and war crimes, that do not require
state action for individual liability under the ATCA. Id. at 945-46. It further
held that "even crimes like rape, torture, and summary execution, which by
themselves require state action for ATCA liability to attach, do not require
state action when committed in furtherance of other crimes like slave trading,
genocide or war crimes, which by themselves do not require state action for
ATCA liability to attach." Id. at 946.
208. Id. at 947. To have a substantial effect, "the criminal act most proba-
1522 [89:1497
TAKING RIGGS SERIOUSLY
knowledge that forced labor was being used to facilitate the
building of the pipeline and that the corporation had benefited
from the practice. 20 9 Rather than applying the law of Myanmar,
state law, or federal common law, the Ninth Circuit agreed to
apply international law developed in criminal tribunals, includ-
ing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia. 210
The court noted that in Prosecutor v. Furundzija,211 a case
tried before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, the "actus reus of aiding and abetting in interna-
tional criminal law requires practical assistance, encourage-
ment, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime."212 Similarly, the mens rea of aiding
and abetting calls for actual or constructive knowledge that the
accomplice's "actions will assist the perpetrator in the commis-
sion of the crime."213 However, this standard does not require
the accomplice to share the mens rea of the principal or even
know the exact crime the perpetrator intends to commit;
rather, the accused need only be aware that "one of a number of
crimes will probably be committed."214
According to the Ninth Circuit, there was sufficient evi-
dence in the case to raise an issue as to whether Unocal hired
the Myanmar military215 and gave "practical assistance" to the
Myanmar military, 216 knew that forced labor was being used,
217
and benefited from the Myanmar military's actions.218 The
court adopted the standard from Kadic v. Karadzic that certain
acts such as torture, rape, and summary execution are viola-
tions of international law only when committed by state actors
bly would not have occurred in the same way [without] someone actfing] in the
role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed." Id. at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v.
Tadic, ICTY-94-1, 688 (May 7, 1997)).
209. Id. at 952.
210. Id. at 950.
211. IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999).
212. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 235); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) ("For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself . .
213. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 245).
214. Id. at 950-51 (quoting Furundzija, IT-95-17/1-T, 245).
215. Id. at 937.
216. Id. at 952.
217. See id. at 953.
218. See id. at 952-53.
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or under color of law, unless they are committed in furtherance
of an offense subject to universal jurisdiction such as forced la-
bor.219 The court held that "Unocal may be liable under the
ATCA for aiding and abetting the Myanmar Military in subject-
ing Plaintiffs to murder and rape," in pursuit of a forced labor
program. 220 However, it concluded that Unocal was not liable
for torture because the allegations of extreme physical abuse
concerned individuals other than the plaintiffs.221 As a defense
to these claims under the ATCA, Unocal asserted the act of
state doctrine. 222 The court held that the doctrine did not pre-
clude the lawsuit because of the high degree of universal con-
demnation of the offenses, the fact that the U.S. government
had "denounced Myanmar's human rights abuses and imposed
sanctions," and the international human rights violations were
not considered to be in the public interest.223
The announcement of a settlement precludes the full Ninth
Circuit's review of the three-judge panel's decision. Despite the
fact that no ATCA case against a corporation has gone to
trial,224 Unocal's willingness to settle the case may still have a
significant impact on the substantive development of ATCA
claims involving human rights violations. 225
F. BURNETT V. AL BARAKA INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION: RECOGNIZING TERRORISM FINANCING UNDER
THE LAW OF NATIONS
In the wake of Unocal and the recognition of corporate li-
ability under the ATCA, at least one federal court has upheld
ATCA claims against financial institutions and other entities
alleged to have knowingly financed acts of terrorism. 226
Victims and family members of victims of the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks invoked the ATCA when they filed a
lawsuit against "the persons and entities that funded and sup-
ported the international terrorist organization known as al
219. Id. at 954 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir.
1995)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 954-55.
222. Id. at 958.
223. Id. at 959.
224. See Girion, supra note 203, at Al.
225. See Boyd, supra note 18, at 1191.
226. Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91-92
(D.D.C. 2003).
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Qaeda," alleging that they had each "directly or indirectly, pro-
vided material support, aided and abetted, or conspired with
the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks."227 Among the nu-
merous defendants are financial institutions and charitable
foundations. 228
In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
ATCA claim, a federal district court concluded that an act of
terrorism such as "aircraft hijacking is generally recognized as
a violation of international law of the type that gives rise to in-
dividual liability."229 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
that "[t]hese terrorist activities constitute violations of the law
of nations.., including those international legal norms prohib-
iting torture, genocide, air piracy, terrorism and mass mur-
der."230 They cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and
several United Nations General Assembly resolutions on meas-
ures to prevent terrorism as examples of the law of nations and
international agreements that had been violated.
231 It is sig-
nificant that the court noted that even though none of the de-
fendants had been sued as "a direct perpetrator of a tort com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations, proof that they were
accomplices, aiders and abettors, or co-conspirators would sup-
port a finding of liability under the ATCA."
232
The court closely scrutinized the plaintiffs' claims against
particular defendants to ensure that they had been given fair
notice of the claims and grounds due to the "extreme nature of
the charge of terrorism."233 Among the allegations closely exam-
ined were those against A1-Haramain Foundation Incorporated,
a private charitable organization, 234 and Al Rajhi Banking &
Investment Corporation (Al Rajhi), a banking network based in
Saudi Arabia. 235 The court concluded that under the theories of
aiding and abetting236 and conspiracy, 23 7 the plaintiffs' com-
227. Id. at 91.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 100. But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("I do not believe that under
current law terrorist attacks amount to law of nations violations.").
230. Burnett Complaint 1124, Burnett (2002 WL 32153625).
231. Id. 1125
232. Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 100.
233. Id. at 103-04.
234. Id. at 104.
235. Id. at 109.
236. The standard for aiding and abetting is:
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plaint properly averred that al Qaeda committed a wrongful act
that resulted in injury to the plaintiffs and that Al-Haramain
Foundation Incorporated knowingly financed al Qaeda in an ef-
fort to further terrorism.238 The court further noted that
"[1]iability for aiding and abetting, or for conspiracy, must be
tied to a substantive cause of action."239 In this case, those
causes of action involved the ATCA, as well as a number of
common law torts, including wrongful death, survival, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. 240
In their complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that Al Rajhi
is one of a number of banks that "have acted as instruments of
terror, in raising, facilitating and transferring money to terror-
ist organizations." 241 They further asserted that Al Rajhi served
as the main bank for a number of charities acting as front
groups for al Qaeda, which used the bank as a funnel for terror-
ism financing and support.242 The court concluded that the "act
of providing material support to terrorists, or 'funneling' money
through banks for terrorists is unlawful and actionable."243
However, the court found that the plaintiffs provided no sup-
port for "the proposition that a bank is liable for injuries done
with money that passes through its hands in the form of depos-
its, withdrawals, check clearing services, or any other routine
banking service."244 Despite this conclusion, the court refused
to dismiss the claim, and instead suggested that Al Rajhi file a
motion for a more definite statement.245 In doing so, this fed-
(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act
that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of
his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time
that he provides the assistance; (3) the defendant must knowingly
and substantially assist the principal violation.
Id. at 104 (quoting Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
237. The elements for conspiracy are:
(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate in
an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an injury
caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the
agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in further-
ance of the common scheme.
Id. at 105 (quoting Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 91, 105.
241. Id. at 109 (quoting the Third Amended Complaint 136).
242. Id. (quoting the Third Amended Complaint 85).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 110.
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eral court recognized that by asserting theories of aiding and
abetting and conspiracy, banks and charities that provide fi-
nancial and material support to terrorists may be held liable
under the ATCA for violating both customary international
norms and treaties against acts of terrorism.
246
This review of the legislative history of the ATCA and four
cases based on ATCA claims reflects the Act's evolving juris-
prudence in response to changes in the global community, in-
cluding new actors, new rights, and new laws. These changes
provide an important foundation for making the case that
Riggs should be held liable under the ATCA for its actions re-
lated to Pinochet and his government.
III. YOU CAN RUN BUT YOU CAN'T HIDE--
ATCA JURISPRUDENCE SHADOWS RIGGS
The release of the Senate Report in June 2004 has refo-
cused attention on Pinochet and the atrocities committed dur-
ing his regime. It has also raised important questions about fi-
nancial institutions' relationships with customers who commit
egregious human rights violations. At what point does such an
institution cross the line from serving simply as a repository for
the funds of those who perpetrate atrocities to becoming a fa-
cilitator of those who breach international law?
247
Evidence thus far does not suggest that Riggs itself com-
mitted the acts of torture, executions, terrorism, and forced
disappearance that occurred during the Pinochet dictator-
ship.248 Rather, the focus is on Riggs's relationship with Pino-
chet and its role as an accomplice to the former dictator and his
government. Thus, the question is whether a viable ATCA
claim can be brought against Riggs for financing a military dic-
tatorship responsible for gross human rights violations and
concealing and laundering millions of dollars possibly looted by
Pinochet during his dictatorship. An evolving theory, which
recognizes corporate liability for serious human rights viola-
tions under international law, may support such a claim.249 Ex-
246. See id. at 107, 110.
247. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 335.
248. See 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NAT'L COMM. ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION, supra note 4, at 35-39.
249. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 412.
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panded notions of liability for nonstate actors such as individu-
als and corporations further bolster this theory. 250
Both the Marcos and Holocaust litigation reveal that fi-
nancial institutions, which actively assist state actors by con-
cealing and laundering looted funds as part of an effort to fur-
ther a campaign of human rights violations, may become liable
under the ATCA for their complicity. 251 The Holocaust and
Unocal litigation add support to this theory of expanded corpo-
rate liability by suggesting that commercial institutions that
knowingly finance and benefit from violations of human rights
may be held accountable as agents or accomplices when they
act in concert with state actors. 252 Burnett advances a similar
argument by suggesting that nonstate actors, who act in con-junction with a terrorist organization to finance terrorist activi-
ties, may also be held liable under the ATCA.253
This evolution, along with the Supreme Court's recent af-
firmation of the applicability of the ATCA in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, indicates that it may be possible to bring a viable
claim against Riggs for its complicity in violations of interna-
tional law committed by Pinochet. The first issue to address is
whether Pinochet's underlying acts of torture, terrorism, forced
disappearance, and summary execution are recognizable viola-
tions of the law of nations for the purpose of bringing an ATCA
claim. ATCA jurisprudence prior to Sosa suggests that is the
case for most if not all of these crimes.254 Consideration of
250. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 946-47 (9th Cir. 2002),
reh'g en banc granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003);
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995); Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at
109-10.
251. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1996); Rama-
sastry, supra note 12, at 388.
252. See supra Part II.D; Unocal, 395 F.3d at 952. But see In re South Afri-
can Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[Tlhis Court
finds that doing business in apartheid South Africa is not a violation of inter-
national law that would support jurisdiction in federal court under the
ATCA.").
253. See Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 91, 99-100.
254. See, e.g., Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945 (concluding that murder and torture
committed by a nonstate actor in furtherance of forced labor violate the law of
nations); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243 (concluding that official state torture and
summary execution are violations of the law of nations); In re Estate of Mar-
cos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that torture, forced disappear-
ance, and summary execution are violations of the law of nations); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that official state
torture violates the law of nations); Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92 (con-
cluding that an ATCA claim may be brought against financial institutions and
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Sosa's requirements of "definite content" and "acceptance
among civilized nations" of modern international norms compa-
rable to that of the historical examples recognized in 1789 adds
additional strength to this argument.255 Just as the drafters of
the ATCA likely viewed the pirate in 1789 as "an enemy of all
mankind,"256 the modern international community has taken a
similar view of those who commit acts of torture, terrorism, ex-
trajudicial killing, and forced disappearance by expressly rec-
ognizing and condemning such acts in treaties and interna-
tional agreements. 257 Further, Congress has also supplied a
mandate by creating an express right of action to bring federal
claims of torture and extrajudicial killing under the Torture
Victim Protection Act.258 In addition, it created a private action
for damages for U.S. nationals who are victims of acts of inter-
other organizational entities alleged to have knowingly financed acts of terror-
ism); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 296, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that torture and extrajudicial
killings violate international law); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185
(D. Mass. 1995) (concluding that disappearance and summary execution are
violations of the law of nations for purposes of a claim under the ATCA).
255. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765 (2004).
256. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
257. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Financ-
ing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408,
U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (1999); International Convention for the Suppression of Ter-
rorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389,
U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1997); Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappear-
ance of Persons, 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994), available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/englishlsigs/a-60.html; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (entered into force
June 26, 1987); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec.
14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1136 U.N.T.S 205 (entered into force Dec. 17, 1979);
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. No. 90; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987) (stating that "[a]
state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain offenses
recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as pi-
racy.., and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where none of the bases of
jurisdiction indicated in § 402 is present"); id. (stating that "[a] state violates
international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones.., the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals .... tor-
ture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment... or...
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights").
258. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763.
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national terrorism under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990.259 Fi-
nally, Sosa's avoidance of the issue of corporate liability under
the ATCA260 does little to detract from the viability of theories
of aiding and abetting and complicity proffered in cases such as
Unocal and Burnett.261
However, an important distinction may need to be made
between those internationally accepted offenses subject to uni-
versal jurisdiction, such as genocide, war crimes, and certain
acts of terrorism, 262 and those which require state action when
committed in isolation, such as torture, forced disappearance,
and summary execution.263 According to Kadic, the ground-
breaking case announcing liability of nonstate actors under the
ATCA, a private actor can be held liable under the Act for vio-
lations of international law requiring official state action when
that actor commits such an offense in pursuit of one or more
violations subject to universal jurisdiction. 264 Thus, acts such as
torture, forced disappearance, and summary execution commit-
ted by a private actor in furtherance of certain acts of terror-
ism, genocide, and war crimes meet this standard. Based upon
this recognition of actionable violations of the law of nations by
nonstate actors, the information that is currently available re-
garding Riggs's relationship with Pinochet suggests that there
are at least two theories of liability that may be argued under
the ATCA.
A. FINANCING A CAMPAIGN OF ATROCITIES
One theory of liability that may be proposed against Riggs
under the ATCA is a theory of aiding and abetting the Pinochet
dictatorship's commission of acts of terrorism, torture, execu-
tion, and forced disappearance by providing financing to the
government. 265 Arguments made by the Burnett plaintiffs and
259. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000).
260. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.20.
261. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 952 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003); Burnett v. Al Ba-
raka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 100 (D.D.C. 2003).
262. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).
263. See id. § 702.
264. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995).
265. A number of federal courts have recognized application of the aiding
and abetting standard to claims brought under the ATCA. See, e.g., Unocal,
395 F.3d at 952; Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 100; Presbyterian Church of Su-
dan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); East-
man Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1091 (S.D. Fla. 1997). But see
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the Unocal plaintiffs lend credence to this theory that providing
material support to those who commit gross human rights vio-
lations such as terrorism and murder violates the law of na-
tions. 266 The standard for aiding and abetting such violations
introduced in both of these cases emphasizes the defendant's
actual or constructive knowledge of the perpetrator's breaches
of international law and the significant assistance provided by
the defendants to the perpetrators. 267 The defendants' assis-
tance must be shown to have had a "substantial effect" on the
perpetrator's actions such that the violations would not have
occurred in the same way without someone serving in the same
role of the defendants. 268
Based upon reports, Riggs's relationship with Pinochet and
the Chilean military extends at least as far back as the mid-
1970s. 269 During the 1970s and possibly into the 1980s, Riggs
provided millions of dollars in loans necessary to help support
Pinochet's military government.270 According to the recent reve-
lations in the Senate Report, Riggs also has had a direct finan-
cial relationship with Pinochet.271 This information demon-
strates that Riggs's actions rise above the minimum needed to
aid and abet. According to the Unocal decision, simple encour-
agement or moral support satisfies the requirements of the ac-
tus reus of aiding and abetting. 272 Financing arguably serves as
more than encouragement to a government seeking to secure
its power through a campaign of torture, disappearance, and
murder; rather, it may directly enable a regime to maintain its
control. Moreover, the Senate Report itself emphasized that
"[h]istory has shown that financing is key to terrorism, corrup-
tion, and other criminal acts."273 Therefore, this evidence sug-
gests that Riggs had the "substantial effect" on Pinochet and
South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
266. See Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 91-92 (concluding that an ATCA claim
may be brought against financial institutions and other organizational entities
alleged to have knowingly financed acts of terrorism); see also Unocal, 395
F.3d at 937 (finding it undisputed that Unocal hired the Myanmar military to
provide security for its pipeline project).
267. See supra notes 212-13, 236, and accompanying text.
268. See Unocal 395 F.3d at 950 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY-94-1,
688 (May 7, 1997)).
269. See KORNBLUH, supra note 7, at 224.
270. See supra notes 7-8.
271. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
272. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950.
273. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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his government necessary to satisfy the aiding and abetting
standard. 274
Throughout its relationship with Pinochet, Riggs had ac-
tual knowledge or constructive knowledge that the regime it
was financing was committing grave human rights abuses con-
demned by the international community. 275 At least 3196 peo-
ple were killed or forcibly disappeared during the dictatorship
while thousands more were tortured or exiled.276 Reports of
these atrocities and denouncements by the international com-
munity occurred throughout the almost two decades of Pino-
chet's control of the government.277 In fact, one of the Pinochet
government's most serious acts of terrorism occurred in Wash-
ington, D.C., the headquarters for Riggs, in 1976.278 This car
bombing, which targeted a former Chilean diplomat, was exe-
cuted in part by the head of Pinochet's secret police, who also
held an account with Riggs in Washington, D.C. 279 Numerous
international organizations, including the United Nations and
the Organization of American States, reported "systematic and
gross violations" of human rights in Chile during the Pinochet
era.28 0 Thus, Riggs had at least constructive knowledge of Pino-
chet's atrocities, which is all that the mens rea standard for
aiding and abetting in Unocal demands.281
While acts of terrorism, summary execution, torture, and
forced disappearance have been recognized to violate the law of
nations,28 2 the issue concerning Riggs is whether financing
such acts is one of the "modest set of actions" that the Supreme
Court held in Sosa would rise to the level of a breach of the law
of nations.283 The Holocaust plaintiffs argued that the Swiss
banks helped finance the Holocaust by laundering, converting,
and concealing assets looted by the Nazis. 28 4 However, at the
274. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950.
275. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
276. Stacie Jonas, The Ripple Effect of the Pinochet Case, in 11 No. 3 HUM.
RTS. BRIEF 36, 36 (2004).
277. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
278. See Robinson, supra note 64.
279. See id.; KORNBLUH, supra note 7, at 224.
280. Jonathan Kandell, Chile Gives Free Rein to Secret Police, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1975, at 1.
281. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc
granted, Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
282. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
283. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2759 (2004).
284. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 391 (citing Plaintiff's Memorandum of
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time of the USMT trials, the tribunal did not conclude that
providing loans to finance war crimes or crimes against human-
ity breached international law. 285 Yet later cases, such as Uno-
cal and Burnett, suggest that international law has evolved in
its denunciation of financing human rights abuses. 286 While the
settlement concerning the Holocaust plaintiffs' claims meant
their validity was never judicially decided, the fact that among
these claims was one alleging that the Swiss banks should be
held liable in part because of their financing activities suggests
that this may be a viable argument.
The international community's concerns regarding multi-
national corporate conduct and financial support of brutal gov-
ernments and terrorist organizations has also evolved. In 1974,
the United Nations approved a declaration calling for a code of
conduct for transnational corporations that would "prevent
economic exploitation of host countries."287 This declaration
was followed by a resolution in 1975 establishing a United Na-
tions commission to form a corporate code of conduct. 288 In
1989, the G7 Heads of State and Government established the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering to "focus[ ]
exclusively on the promotion of international action to combat
money laundering and to facilitate the confiscation of the pro-
ceeds of crime."289 This mandate was expanded to specifically
include the issue of terrorism financing in 2001.290 Similarly, in
1999, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Con-
Law at 49, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 14 Fed. Appx. 132 (2d Cir.
2001) (No. 96-CV-516)).
285. Id. at 415 (quoting United States v. Von Weizsaecker (Ministries
Case), XIV Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremburg Military Tribunals,
622).
286. See Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. &
Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 91 (D.D.C. 2003).
287. Boyd, supra note 18, at 1194 n.259 (citing Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR,
6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527, 528, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974)).
288. Id. (citing E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at
3, U.N. Doc. 5570/Add. 1 (1975)). The United Nations has since abandoned its
efforts to create a corporate code of conduct. Id. at 1195. However, in 1999, the
United Nations implemented the Global Compact, which encourages interna-
tional corporations to follow nine principles of corporate responsibilities, in-
cluding one against human rights abuses. Baker, supra note 155, at 125.
289. W. Gilmore, International Financial Counterterrorism Initiatives, in
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 189,
197 (C. Fijnaut et al. eds., 2004).
290. Id. at 197-98.
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vention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 291
These acts support a finding of an international norm against
financing perpetrators of human rights abuse, including terror-
ism.
This condemnation by the international community of
those who provide financial support to gross human rights vio-
lators is further reflected in Burnett.292 In that case, a federal
district court held that the plaintiffs could bring a viable claim
under the ATCA against certain entities, including possibly a
bank, which were alleged to have knowingly funded and sup-
ported terrorism. 293 By recognizing that certain terrorist activi-
ties violate the law of nations, the court concluded that a claim
brought under the ATCA can be made against entities shown to
be accomplices or aiders and abettors to terrorists. 294
Although the district court denied the motion to dismiss
the Burnett plaintiffs' ATCA claim, it questioned whether a
bank that served as a funnel for other organizations, which in
turn financed terrorism, could be found liable. 295 If it is ulti-
mately held that the Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corpora-
tion simply acted as an unknowing repository for other organi-
zations that were involved in financing terrorism, the Riggs
case is clearly distinguishable. Riggs did not simply serve as a
funnel for other third-party organizations to finance terror.
Rather, Riggs directly provided material support to Pinochet
and the Chilean military in the forms of credits 296 and money
laundering.297 Thus, its situation more closely mirrors that of
Al Haramain Foundation Incorporated, a private charity, which
is alleged to have knowingly financed the September 11 terror-
ist activities, 298 and that of the Swiss banks, which are alleged
291. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Ter-
rorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408, U.N. Doc.
A/54/49 (1999). The Convention requires financial institutions to implement
"the most efficient measures available for the identification of their usual or
occasional customers, as well as customers in whose interest accounts are
opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and
report transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity." Gilmore,
supra note 289, at 192.
292. See Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 100
(D.D.C. 2003).
293. Id. at 99-100.
294. Id. at 100.
295. Id. at 109.
296. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
297. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
298. See Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
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to have been involved in financing the commission of the Holo-
caust by the Nazis.299 Riggs knowingly provided support to Pi-
nochet and his dictatorship, 30 0 even at a time when the interna-
tional community had condemned the former dictator and his
military government for committing human rights atrocities.
30 1
Thus, Riggs should be held responsible under the ATCA for its
actions.
B. SUSPICIOUS ACCOUNTS: LOOTING CLAIMS UNDER THE ATCA
Another theory that may be posited against Riggs under
the ATCA is one of aiding and abetting Pinochet in his efforts
to conceal, launder, and convert funds potentially looted by the
former dictator. This theory is similar to that argued by the
Marcos and Holocaust plaintiffs. 30 2 However, to make such a
claim, it must first be established that the funds in the Riggs
secret accounts were indeed looted by Pinochet during his dic-
tatorship.
From practically the moment the Senate Report became
public in late June 2004, speculation began as to the source of
Pinochet's accounts. It did not take long for that speculation to
turn to accusations that Pinochet's wealth may have come from
the personal funds of victims of atrocities that occurred during
his dictatorship 303 or looted government money. 304 The current
president of the Chilean agency that oversees government
funds "said it was mathematically impossible for Pinochet to
have saved that much from his government salary and pen-
sion," particularly in light of the fact that he is "not known to
have had any other source of income." 30 5 According to one ac-
count, Pinochet's family was not "among the elites or well-to-
do."306 Rather, his father was a customs official who sold insur-
299. See supra text accompanying note 184.
300. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
302. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 430; Michael J. Bazyler,
www.swissbankclaims.com: The Legality and Morality of the Holocaust-era
Settlement with the Swiss Banks, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 64, 77 (2001).
303. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35.
304. Timothy L. O'Brien, At Riggs Bank, A Tangled Path Led to Scandal,
N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2004, at Al.
305. Tobar & Vergara, supra note 26.
306. BURBACH, supra note 3, at 21.
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ance on the side, and his mother was a housekeeper. 307 Pino-
chet himself entered the military at the age of seventeen.308
In response to the disclosure of the Riggs secret accounts,
Pinochet, his family, and his attorneys have claimed various
sources for the money, including personal savings, campaign
donations, interest, and most recently, commissions from for-
eign governments. 309 According to a Riggs internal memoran-
dum discovered by investigators, Riggs "estimated Pinochet's
net worth at between $50 million and $100 million."310 Reports
also indicate that Pinochet had at least four other secret bank
accounts in the United States in addition to those at Riggs. 311
These accounts were opened in his name and in the names of
two of his children in four other U.S. banks. 312
Opponents of Pinochet have said that the disclosure of the
Riggs secret bank accounts "give[s] credibility to claims that
[Pinochet] took bribes from arms dealers and, possibly, si-
phoned off money from military accounts." 31 3 The Senate Re-
port adds credence to both of these suggestions, which notes
speculation of illegal arms deals and the long-standing rela-
tionship between Riggs and the Chilean military. 314 It further
notes that one OCC examiner questioned why Riggs would take
such a risk when it knew that Pinochet had "total control over
the Chilean economy" during his seventeen-year dictatorship
and there was the "potential of funds derived from possible ter-
ror and personal funds of the thousands of missing people."315
These reports add strength to a theory of looting similar to
that alleged by the Holocaust plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in the
Marcos litigation. At a minimum, the recognition by the federal
courts in the Marcos litigation that the Swiss banks were char-
acterized as "agents" of Marcos lends support to the theory that
Riggs served as Pinochet's "agent" by concealing his assets,
laundering his money, and assisting him in evading legal pro-
307. Id. at 21-22.
308. Id. at 23.
309. Tobar & Vergara, supra note 26; O'Brien & Rohter, supra note 36.
310. Tobar & Vergara, supra note 26.
311. O'Hara, supra note 38.
312. Id.
313. Kevin G. Hall, Chilean Dictator Faces Tax-Evasion Probe from Re-
spected Judge, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 3, 2004, at 1.
314. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27.
315. See id. at 36.
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ceedings. 316 It is important to emphasize that Riggs's complicity
in maintaining secret accounts for Pinochet's dictatorship dates
at least as far back as 1975.3 17 During this thirty-year relation-
ship, there have been credible reports of gross human rights
violations committed by Pinochet's government,318 questions
about the source of Pinochet's wealth,319 and a long extradition
battle in London.320 Yet Riggs, similar to the Swiss banks, vol-
untarily accepted assets it knew or should have known were
suspicious 32 1 and possibly came from Pinochet's looting during
his dictatorship. 322 In fact, Riggs not only has agreed to plead
guilty to federal criminal charges for failing to report suspicious
financial transactions involving Pinochet's accounts, but also it
recently settled a lawsuit in Spain, which alleged that the bank
had illegally concealed Pinochet's assets and committed money-
laundering offenses. 323
Thus, it is possible to make an argument similar to that
made by the Holocaust plaintiffs that Riggs, by accepting looted
funds and engaging in a conspiracy to convert them, 324 aided
and abetted Pinochet's brutal campaign of torture, extrajudicial
killings, forced disappearance, and terrorism. Claims made by
the Holocaust plaintiffs also support this argument. They cited
the cases of German bankers and industrialists convicted by
the USMT for crimes related to plundering and looting prop-
erty.325 These convictions indicate that accepting and maintain-
ing looted assets as part of a campaign of egregious human
rights abuses violate customary international law.
326
Opponents of such a recognition under international law
argue that looting, which amounts to a government's expropria-
tion of its citizens' property, does not rise to the level of a viola-
tion of the law of nations.327 However, even those who have
316. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 95 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 1996).
317. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
318. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
319. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
320. See supra note 45.
321. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 36 (noting that Riggs never
filed a suspicious activity report regarding the Pinochet accounts).
322. See supra notes 304, 313, and accompanying text.
323. Dash, supra note 71; Hansell, supra note 69.
324. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 390-91.
325. See supra text accompanying note 192.
326. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 422.
327. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964)
("[W]e decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a
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made this argument admit that opinion is divided on this is-
sue.328 In fact, the tribunals held after World War II recognized
that spoliation and seizure of Jewish property by Germans,
who aided the Nazi government, were war crimes, particularly
when they "involved a systematic program of plunder."329 More
recently, a federal court in 2003 held in a case involving a claim
under the ATCA that a government's expropriation of its own
citizens' property, when "committed as part of a genocide or
war crimes, may violate the law of nations."330
Pinochet, too, may have violated international law by con-
ducting a "systematic program of plunder" in furtherance of
genocide, war crimes, or both. As part of the military junta di-
recting the coup in 1973, Pinochet issued a decree declaring a
"state of siege,"33' which was to be understood as constituting a
"state of war."332 Moreover, the Spanish magistrate who
brought charges against Pinochet in London in 1998 originally
charged him with genocide, among other crimes. 333 If investiga-
tions find that Pinochet participated in or directed a "system-
atic program of plunder," in furtherance of either of these
crimes or possibly even acts of terrorism,33 4 Riggs may be held
liable under international law for its complicity in receiving,
taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country... in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles .. "); Jafari v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 215 (S.D. 111. 1982) ("[Ihe 'law of
nations' does not prohibit a government's expropriation of the property of its
own nationals."); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712(1987) ("A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting
from: (1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another state
that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is discriminatory, or (c) is not accom-
panied by provision for just compensation ....
328. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
329. Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 425-26.
330. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp.
2d 117, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding an ATCA claim alleging defendant
French financial institutions "aid[ed] and abett[ed] the Vichy and Nazi re-
gimes to plunder plaintiffs' private property, depriving members of the Jewish
community in France the means to finance their escape").
331. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NAT'L COMM. ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION, supra note 4, at 99.
332. Id. at 100. Throughout Pinochet's dictatorship, military tribunals were
held in Chile to try civilians. Id. at 99-116.
333. Jonas, supra note 276, at 36.
334. Certain acts of terrorism may also be subject to universal jurisdiction.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 404 (1987).
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concealing, and laundering Pinochet's plundered wealth. 335
Thus, Riggs's voluntary actions of knowingly concealing and
laundering funds potentially looted by a dictator allegedly re-
sponsible for numerous atrocities may lead to a finding of liabil-
ity for the financial institution under the ATCA.
C. ON THE DEFENSIVE: RESPONSES TO CLAIMS UNDER
THE ATCA
Multinational enterprises that engage in activities similar
to Riggs are not without arguments against applying the ATCA
to their commercial conduct. In addition to rejecting the claims
themselves, corporations have invoked a variety of procedural
objections and policy arguments against the use of the ATCA.
The Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, by cautioning
lower courts to consider the practical consequences of recogniz-
ing an actionable violation of international law, bolstered the
use of at least two defenses by ATCA defendants. 336 In particu-
lar, the Court pointed to considerations concerning the poten-
tial impact of a claim under the ATCA on U.S. foreign affairs,
as well as the application of a domestic exhaustion require-
ment.3 37 In addition to making both of these arguments, a po-
tential corporate defendant such as Riggs may also invoke a
statute of limitations as a defense to ATCA liability.
Even before Sosa gave its nod of approval, corporations had
increasingly begun to look to foreign relations as a defense,
33 8
and in particular, the act of state doctrine.339 Articulated more
than a century ago, the act of state doctrine is based on the no-
tion that "[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the inde-
pendence of every other Sovereign state, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory."340 Thus, following
this reasoning, the judiciary "should not decide cases which
have vast foreign policy implications, since the Executive and
Legislative branches are Constitutionally endowed with such
power."341 The Supreme Court has set out three factors to con-
sider in deciding whether the doctrine should be applied in a
335. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
336. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 & n.21 (2004).
337. Id. at 2766 n.21.
338. O'Donnell, supra note 14, at 224.
339. See id.; Burley, supra note 12, at 461-62.
340. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
341. Bowersett, supra note 129, at 366.
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particular case: (1) the "degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law"; (2) the impor-
tance of "the implications of an [international law] issue ... for
[U.S.] foreign relations"; and (3) whether "the government
which perpetrated the challenged act of state" is still "in exis-
tence."342 The Ninth Circuit has added a fourth factor to con-
sider: "whether the foreign state was acting in the public inter-
est."
3 4 3
The use of this doctrine to dismiss ATCA lawsuits brought
against U.S. corporations has found a strong supporter in the
current Bush administration.344 Arguing that such cases might
damage U.S. foreign relations, both the U.S. Departments of
State and Justice have intervened on behalf of defendant U.S.
corporations sued under the ATCA.345 Advocates of the Bush
administration's efforts to limit the scope of the ATCA claim
that the Act may seriously harm U.S. relations with other
countries and "could devastate global trade and investment"
particularly in developing countries. 346 A recent district court
decision heeded this argument when it dismissed a lawsuit
filed against more than thirty corporations for their role in fi-
nancing the apartheid regime in South Africa. 347
Similar arguments under the act of state doctrine are
likely to be posited if an ATCA lawsuit were brought against
Riggs for its relationship with Pinochet and his military dicta-
torship, particularly in light of Chile's reinstatement of democ-
racy and its growing trade ties with the United States. How-
ever, an examination of the factors to consider before applying
the act of state doctrine weighs in favor of not dismissing such
a case. There is a high degree of worldwide condemnation of
atrocities committed by Pinochet's regime. 348 The dictatorship
no longer exists, and it was not acting in the public interest
342. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
343. Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F. 2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989).
344. See Schrage, supra note 157, at 161.
345. The Department of Justice intervened on behalf of the Unocal Corpo-
ration in Doe I v. Unocal Corp. Id. at 161-62. The Department of State inter-
vened on behalf of the Exxon Mobil Corporation, charged with human rights
abuses in Indonesia, in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C.
filed June 19, 2001). O'Donnell, supra note 14, at 223-24.
346. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, supra note 75, at 245-47.
347. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553-54
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
348. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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when it murdered over 3000 people and committed numerous
other human rights abuses. 349
The one factor that weighs toward application of the doc-
trine is the consideration of foreign relations between the
United States and Chile. However, this would not be a repeat of
Pinochet's trial in London;350 the target would be Riggs in this
hypothetical ATCA lawsuit, a U.S.-based financial institution,
and not Pinochet himself. Moreover, the ATCA plaintiff in such
a case may not be a Chilean; victims of human rights abuse
under Pinochet's dictatorship came from a variety of coun-
tries.351 And as a "self-proclaimed human rights leader,"352 the
United States should recognize that corporate accountability
advances its global economic interests.3 53 Further, corporations
that profit from their relationships with governments responsi-
ble for gross human rights violations, such as the Pinochet gov-
ernment, "should not get to do business as usual in the United
States."354
Another defense that a corporation such as Riggs could
make if an ATCA claim were filed against it is the domestic ex-
haustion requirement.3 55 Proponents of this principle argue
that "[m]ost countries and regional courts defer to a home
state, requiring domestic remedies be exhausted or unavailable
before other options may be utilized."356 Thus, if a claim is filed
against Riggs in a U.S. court under the ATCA, the U.S. court
should defer to the Chilean judiciary, for instance, to resolve
the matter. However, others have pointed out that the ATCA
contains no such limitation.3 57 The Supreme Court in Sosa
noted in a footnote that it would consider this limitation in an
appropriate case but did not specifically state what an appro-
priate case would be.35 s Even if such a requirement were con-
sidered in a potential lawsuit against Riggs under the ATCA, a
remedy provided by a U.S. court is appropriate in part because
349. See Jonas, supra note 276, at 36.
350. See supra note 45.
351. See 2 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NAT'L COMM. ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION, supra note 4, at 901.
352. O'Donnell, supra note 14, at 256.
353. Schrage, supra note 157, at 153 (citation omitted).
354. See Ramasastry, supra note 12, at 408.
355. Similarly, Riggs could argue dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 472 (2d Cir. 2002).
356. Thorp, supra note 137, at 172.
357. Hufbauer & Mitrokostas, supra note 75, at 252.
358. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004).
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Riggs itself is headquartered in Washington, D.C. Moreover,
thousands of Chileans sought refuge in foreign countries, in-
cluding the United States, during the Pinochet dictatorship.359
It is possible that Chilean nationals living in the United States
could seek to bring such a claim.
Riggs also has another potential defense against an ATCA
lawsuit. More than fourteen years have passed since Pinochet's
dictatorship ended in Chile. 360 Arguably, a statute of limita-
tions could bar a lawsuit based on atrocities committed during
Pinochet's dictatorship. However, the ATCA contains no provi-
sion time barring lawsuits.3 61 Some courts, such as the Ninth
Circuit, have implemented a ten-year limitation.362 Others have
made exceptions for ongoing violations of international law,
based on the notion that a 'limitations period for a continuing
offense does not begin until the offense is complete." 363 Such an
exception may apply to an ATCA claim brought against Riggs
based on the fact that many of those who disappeared during
the Pinochet regime have not been found; thus their disappear-
ances may be viewed as ongoing crimes. 364 Further, Riggs does
not come to the table with clean hands, as it helped conceal
knowledge of potentially looted assets by Pinochet. 365 Thus, any
such claim has been frustrated by Riggs's actions. For this rea-
son and the ones concerning the act of state doctrine and the
domestic exhaustion requirement, a claim brought against
Riggs under the ATCA should not be precluded by any of these
defenses.
359. See David Binder, U.S. To Admit Hundreds of Chilean Exiles, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1975, at 2; Marvine Howe, Chilean Deadline Is Worrying Po-
litical Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1974, at 6.
360. 1 REPORT OF THE CHILEAN NAT'L COMM. ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION, supra note 4, at xxiii (noting that Patricio Aylwin became
the elected president of Chile on March 11, 1990, thus ending the military
government).
361. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
362. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 317 F.3d 1005, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003).
363. See United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1995).
364. To prevent the application of Chile's amnesty law for human rights
violations committed by Pinochet's regime occurring before 1978, some Chil-
ean judges have concluded that in cases of forced disappearances, these crimes
are actually ongoing, and thus may be prosecuted as aggravated kidnappings.
Jonas, supra note 276, at 36.
365. See Stephanie A. Bilenker, Comment, In re Holocaust Victims' Assets
Litigation: Do The U.S. Courts Have Jurisdiction Over the Lawsuits Filed by
Holocaust Survivors Against the Swiss Banks?, 21 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE
251, 277 n.180 (1997).
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TAKING RIGGS SERIOUSLY
While courts are only beginning to interpret Sosa and its
impact on the future of the ATCA, "the trend toward expanding
the duties and obligations of global corporations to the indi-
viduals and communities touched by their operations seems
destined to accelerate" in light of globalization, advances in
communications, and the availability of "theories such as negli-
gence, product liability, and conspiracy" to "challenge corporate
conduct."366 In fact, at least one state court has accepted a case
linking the activities of multinational corporations to human
rights violations committed by government actors. 367 This is,
perhaps, evidence that restrictions on corporate conduct in the
global community are tightening as courts demand greater ac-
countability for corporations' actions.
CONCLUSION
The rediscovery of the ATCA in 1980 has resulted in a
powerful tool to hold violators of human rights accountable.
Over the last quarter of a century, U.S. courts have held both
state actors and private individuals liable under the Act. More
recently, ATCA's evolving jurisprudence has turned to corpo-
rate complicity in violations of international law.
This expansion has brought the actions of financial institu-
tions, such as Riggs, that turn a blind eye to atrocities commit-
ted by their customers within the reach of the ATCA. Over a
period of at least three decades, Riggs both financed Pinochet's
brutal dictatorship and assisted Pinochet in concealing and
laundering millions of dollars in potentially looted funds. As in-
vestigations continue to uncover more evidence of ties between
Riggs and Pinochet's crimes, an ATCA claim against Riggs con-
tinues to strengthen. Even now, individuals and organizations
who seek compensation for victims of the Pinochet regime can
look to ATCA jurisprudence for the possibility of obtaining jus-
tice.
366. Schrage, supra note 157, at 162-63.
367. See, e.g. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. BC 237 980 and BC 237 679, at 2-3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 14, 2004).
154320051
